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DAVID LINDSAY AND THE SHAPE OF
INNER BEING
Eric Wills

David Lindsay’s literary reputation survives largely on the basis of his first
novel, A Voyage to Arcturus. First published in 1920, this ostensibly
science fiction adventure sold poorly in Lindsay’s lifetime but has attracted
many more readers since and remains in print. By contrast, his later stories
have been overlooked and have been difficult to obtain. This may change,
as there are now readily available editions of, for example, Sphinx, first
published in 1923, and Devil’s Tor, first published in 1932. In total,
Lindsay produced seven novels, including one unfinished at his death, not
published till 1976, and an unpublished collection of aphorisms, first
published in 1972.
The similarities and resonances throughout the stories suggest a unity
of vision, and in this respect, Lindsay’s work warrants closer scrutiny and
critical evaluation. It is sometimes said of the later stories that they are
marred by defects in literary style. In an early critical survey, J. B. Pick
suggested Lindsay’s disappointment at the reception of his earlier work
had led him to write for his own satisfaction, anticipating he would be
ignored and so neglecting the demands of readers.1 Nevertheless, his books
can sustain a reader’s interest in the intellectual puzzles they deal in, and
while a writer’s philosophical ambitions do not excuse deficiencies in
presentation and structure, Lindsay’s work is interesting in this respect:
that it is drawn on issues around ideas and the shape they take in art.
Among the aphorisms which make up his Sketch Notes for a New
System of Philosophy, Lindsay indicates his primary concern in note (192),
in which he declares the attainment and communication of the Sublime is

1

J.B. Pick, “The Work of David Lindsay,” Studies in Scottish Literature, 1.3
(1963): 171-182 (176-177); and cf. Pick’s essay in Colin Wilson, J.B. Pick, and
E.H. Visiak, The Strange Genius of David Lindsay (London: John Baker, 1970).
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the “grandest of all ambitions.” The opening chapter of A Voyage to
Arcturus certainly challenges readers’ expectations. A number of
characters attend a séance, but only the late arrivals will carry the story
forward in the next chapter. The others have no further role and are simply
dropped. With the reader seemingly in mind, Lindsay allows the spirit
medium, Mr. Backhouse, to advance a hope that his audience will stay for
the whole performance, assuring them a manifestation will take place.
Asked how he is certain, Backhouse only answers that he dreams with eyes
open and that others see his dreams. His questioner takes little interest in
this reply and only compliments him on a “beautiful” remark.3 All of this,
of course, is Lindsay’s own stage-setting, like the stage props and orchestra
Mrs. Trent has organised for the séance, and for which she has imitated an
Egyptian-themed staging of Mozart’s The Magic Flute. But the direction of
the story changes abruptly as a terrific sound outside of crashing masonry
announces the arrival of Maskull and Nightspore, and the conventional
fiction of the séance is left behind.
It is telling that Lindsay indicates Mr. Backhouse is not to be taken for
a charlatan. The third late arrival to the séance, Krag, calls him a “spirit
usher,” and Lindsay carefully expands on what he does, explaining it in
terms of making the invisible momentarily solid and coloured. This as
easily describes Lindsay’s own ambition, to give shape and form to the
Sublime. If this can have a destructive, Dionysian aspect in the creation of
new forms, then it is fitting that the sound of crashing masonry signals the
entrance of Maskull and Nightspore. The story proceeds with their journey
to Arcturus, to arrive on its planet, Tormance, where Maskull will go in
search of its god, Surtur, also variously known as Crystalman and Shaping.
Again, the parallel here is with the shape Lindsay gives to his particular
vision.
In this essay, I seek to identify that aesthetic on the basis of his sources
and some major influences on his thinking. While this may not settle
questions around the merit of Lindsay’s work in solely literary terms, it
2

Bernard Sellin, The Life and Works of David Lindsay, transl. Kenneth Gunnell
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 175, 245 n. 1. Quotations below
from Lindsay’s Sketch Notes for a New System of Philosophy are from the selection
included in Sellin’s study, referenced there and in my text by Lindsay’s own
numbering. The full typescript, ca. 1920, of Lindsay’s Sketch Notes, with 545
aphorisms, is in the National Library of Scotland, MS.27247. The first selection
was published in Lines Review, no. 40 (March 1972), followed by Sellin’s
selection; the 1972 text was republished with an additional “Twenty Philosophical
Notes,” in Abraxas, no. 6 (1996); and collected in A Voyage to Arcturus (London:
Savoy Books, 2002).
3
David Lindsay, A Voyage to Arcturus (London: Methuen, 1920; London:
Gollancz, 1948, reissued St. Ives: Gollancz, 2003), referenced below in the text.
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does provide a framework for judging whether he succeeds or falls short in
his ambition. I propose that a way into making this judgement is through
the use Lindsay makes of the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, including some
of Hegel’s own imagery. In Hegel’s philosophy, the universal Spirit
(Geist), or the Absolute, is realised in mankind’s own self-development,
including a progression in artistic and religious forms and expression. This
has a basis in the central tenet of Jacob Boehme’s theology, in which the
divine is dependent on creation for its own self-realisation. I propose this
underpins the sense in which David Lindsay intends the invisible is made
visible, in the shaping of his characters’ own self-realisations, and through
the reader’s own engagement with the texts.
In his study of Lindsay’s life and works, Bernard Sellin arrives at a
broadly Platonic account of his appeal to the Sublime, citing number (337)
of the Sketch Notes, in which Lindsay writes: “The Sublime world is not a
metaphysical theory but a terrible fact, which stands above and behind the
world, and governs all its manifestations.”4 Similarly, he points to the
character Peter Copping’s talk in Devil’s Tor, of experiencing the Sublime
in privileged moments like “a violent rent in the noisome fogs of life,” and
he treats this in terms of insight into a transcendent reality.5 This supports a
sense of an imprisoned soul and its redemption in escape from the confines
of egoistic individuality and our “common” attachments to the everyday
world. At stake is some notion of a “higher” self, as something obscured in
conventional dealings in the world, or drawn as a conflict between man in
nature and a sense of the divine. But Lindsay himself, in note (204), in
which he says the Sublime world is far more real, still insists on its
vivacity and substantiality being “a key to the understanding of worldlife.”6 That is to say, in relation to the actual world we live in, not a world
behind it.
The issue here is important in deciding a broadly framed approach to
Lindsay’s work as a whole. Particularly open to question are claims made
for its gnostic character. The memorable line from the Voyage, that
“Crystalman’s Empire is but a shadow on the face of Muspel” can suggest
a gnostic vision of a “false” creator god, presiding over an illusory world,
obscuring what is real (Voyage, 280). But a recognition of the influence of
Hegel’s philosophy will serve to revise and clarify what has been too easily
labelled Lindsay’s gnosticism. Repeatedly, throughout his stories, Lindsay
speaks in terms of how the invisible is made visible. This draws attention
to what is “visible” in the texts themselves, which is only to say that the
4

Sellin, Life and Works, 177.
Sellin, 179, citing David Lindsay, Devil’s Tor (orig. London: G.P. Putnam, 1932;
repr. n.p.: Bookship, 2018), 476; subsequent references in the text.
6
Sellin, 245, n.5.
5
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Sublime is tied to matters around the choice of imagery or to the symbolic
character generally of the stories. And with the Hegelian sense of selfrealisation in human creativity as a basis for addressing Lindsay’s
intentions in putting his ideas into fiction, his characters are not merely
juxtapositions of ideas. Rather, the stories have an initiatory aspect,
similarly to what has been claimed for Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, in
which the self-realisation of Spirit is expressed in Hegel’s philosophy
through the very form this text takes in communicating it.7
In Sphinx and Devil’s Tor, published in 1923 and 1932 respectively,
Lindsay draws on chapter VII of the Phenomenology of Spirit, with the key
image in each book, the black stone in Devil’s Tor and the Egyptian
sphinx, tied to their symbolic character in the use that Hegel makes of
them.8 Sellin has pointed out Lindsay’s immersion in German philosophy,
in Hegel and Boehme, and more importantly, he says, in Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche, but he does not go into detail. For example, he only notes that
the character Saltfleet in Devil’s Tor “has something of the aura of
Nietzsche’s grandeur about him,” without addressing Nietzsche’s influence
as such.9 I shall argue that Lindsay’s philosophical stance is closely
modelled on that of Hegel and Jacob Boehme. I shall also challenge the
view that Lindsay dismisses the world as wholly illusory. Rather, what is
“real” is delivered in mankind’s own intellectual development, as its own
self-realisation, and so made “visible.” The scare quotes here are only to
indicate that as a philosophical position, and so briefly outlined, this
requires much further exposition and scrutiny, but I am concerned
primarily in this essay with the sense of it in Lindsay’s own artistry.
Sphinx
Lindsay’s Sphinx begins with Nicholas Cabot taking up lodgings with the
Sturt family. He has invented a machine for recording unconscious
dreaming and sets about constructing it, with the paid help of Maurice
Ferreira. The central character in the book is Lore Jensen, a musical
composer who latterly has lost her inspiration. In Cabot’s trials with the
machine she appears in dream scenarios and the book ends with one of the
Sturt daughters, Evelyn, recording her own father’s dreaming as he lies
unconscious, having collapsed on hearing that Lore Jensen has drowned.
There is a relation between these visionary scenes and the events played
out by the characters in the actual world. One or other is seemingly a
7

See Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2001).
8
G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, transl. A. V. Miller, with with analysis
of the text and foreword by J.N. Findlay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 410-478.
9
Sellin, 52-53, 190.
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shadow world, and there is a demonic aspect to the character of Maurice
Ferreira, with whom Lore Jensen is in a destructive relationship.
The title of the book is from her piano composition. This enigmatic
piece is described as starting drowsily, building like a rising storm, then
quietening in the end to take shape as an “indubitable question.”10 In the
characters’ discussion which follows Evelyn’s playing, Lore is said never
to explain what was in her mind when writing it. The enigma, then, is to
say what its riddle is. Reflecting on the title, and taking the Egyptian
sphinx as a personification of Nature, Evelyn suggests it signifies a
question, why we are living in the world, which the inability to answer
requires that we must die. In section (71) of The World as Will and
Representation, Schopenhauer remarks that humans, unlike other animals
close to “mother nature,” are alone in having a metaphysical need to find
meaning in the world. 11 Boasting in a letter that his own philosophy had
answered the riddle of existence, he declared he would like to have a signet
ring made with an image of the sphinx falling into the abyss.12
Approaches to Lindsay’s work have emphasised the influence of
Schopenhauer, and not least in terms of a pessimistic judgement that life is
characterised by pain and suffering. But Schopenhauer also writes in
section (71) that a saintly denial of life cannot aspire to its complete
negation without incoherence. Our lives are a painful litany of
disappointment consequent on the frustration of our will, but to try to
envisage a release into nothing at all is only a kind of mysticism, even if
we give it a name, such as Nirvana. As such, the ascetic’s negation is, he
says, inexorably tied to what is negated.13 Nicholas Cabot declares a
recognisably Schopenhauerian asceticism in relation to the company of
women, but, nevertheless, he is quickly caught up in the various intrigues
forming the body of the narrative. There is also more at stake in Lindsay’s
Sphinx, and in his other works, than just an allegory of Schopenhauer’s
metaphysics of Will.
It is significant that Nicholas Cabot disagrees with Evelyn in their
discussion around Lore Jensen’s composition. In contrast to Evelyn’s
suggestion, he characterises the sphinx as a goddess of dreams, as standing
for the way in which a deep unconscious activity can attain visible form.
Importantly, this is a precise allusion to the place Hegel accords Egyptian
religion in the self-realisation of Spirit, or the Absolute. The starting point
10

David Lindsay, Sphinx (orig. London: John Long, 1923; [n.p.]: Bookship, 2019),
30; subsequent references in the text.
11
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, transl. E.F.J Payne
(New York: Dover, 1969).
12
Margrieta Beer, Schopenhauer (London: T.C. & E.C. Jack, 1914), 27.
13
Schopenhauer, 408-412.
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of Hegel’s thinking is traceable to Boehme’s account of God coming to
know Himself only through the Creation. In Hegel’s philosophy, this
informs the general sense in which self-awareness depends upon reflection
in an “other”. The self-realisation of the Absolute in religion is addressed
in chaper VII. There, Hegel begins with natural religion and its progression
to a subsequent form, in art. On the cusp of this transition is the shape it
takes in the Egyptians’ religious iconography.
The relevant paragraph in the Phenomenology is (697), where Hegel
identifies a tension in the human spirit seeking its self-conscious separation
from animalistic Nature, which is expressed in such half-animal, halfhuman forms as the Egyptian sphinx.14 Hegel expands on this in his
Lectures on Fine Art, where he notes the Egyptians set up hundreds of
sculpted sphinxes in rows and on a huge scale, and explains the import of
this visually symbolic form, having the hybrid character of a woman’s
head on the body of a lion. At issue is the limited form of this
representation:
Out of the dull strength and power of the animal the human spirit
tries to push itself forward, without coming to a perfect portrayal of
its own freedom and animated shape, because it must still remain
confused and associated with what is other than itself.15

The key point Hegel goes on to make here is that, as a monster asking a
riddle, the sculpted sphinx is itself symbolic of the Absolute’s struggle for
self-awareness. I suggest that Lindsay, through Cabot, indicates Hegel’s
view of self-realisation emerging out of what is strange or “other” to it.
This characterises Lore Jensen’s own inspiration, and it underpins the
characters’ interactions with each other. It can also be Lindsay’s intention
for his own texts, in regard to their visionary episodes and in being
structured to encourage a similar tension in the reader.
Devil’s Tor
The theme of self-realisation is picked up again in Devil’s Tor. Here, the
narrative is centred on the bringing together of two halves of a mysterious
black stone. It begins with Hugh Drapier visiting his cousin Ingrid
Fleming, who lives with her mother, Helga, and uncle Magnus, on the edge
of Dartmoor. Drapier has returned from abroad with the stone, which was
entrusted to him by an archaeologist, Stephen Arsinal, and his companion,
Henry Saltfleet. They have stolen it from a remote temple in Tibet, and do
not want to be caught in possession of it while making their escape back to
Britain. A fated sequence of events is seemingly at work as Drapier
14

Hegel, Phenomenology, 423.
G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, transl. T. M. Knox, 2 vols
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), vol. I, part II, sect. I, cap. I (c3).
15
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subsequently discovers the other half in an ancient tomb on Dartmoor,
beneath Devil’s Tor. The characters are all affected by the presence of
these stones, some having visions of an ancient goddess figure associated
with it. Ingrid Fleming is fated to re-embody this goddess figure. Her
fiancé, Peter Copping, had seen in her a “glimpse of the Unseen” (Devil’s
Tor, 477), and painted her as the youthful Madonna. But she breaks her
engagement to him in favour of Saltfleet, and with the stone halves joined
again, the story ends with an anticipation of some kind of human renewal
or revaluation.
Having played his part in bringing back the other half of the stone,
Drapier dies when a loosened boulder on Devil’s Tor rolls towards him. He
is a kind of gloomy ascetic, and in chapter VI he dwells on three “strains”
on his life. First and second, these are his anticipation of death and his
resignation in respect of seemingly fated circumstances. The other is
simply his amazement in staring into the black stone in his possession,
which he describes as:
the most amazing vision of natural beauty, reduced to the
dimensions of art, that could at any time possibly have existed on
earth. It amazed, because it was as living as a mirror reflecting real
things, and yet the real things in its case were nowhere present
(Devil’s Tor, 86)

His thoughts repeat Lindsay’s theme of the invisible made visible.
Drapier also reflects on his own experiences taken as an intimation of the
Sublime, as reminders of “some grander world not present,” and offers his
“formula” that:
the merely beautiful might suffice a soul, but that the sublime
(which was the shadow of the beauty of another world) could never
suffice, since with it came gropings that must amount to pain (82).

Sellin cites note (79) of the Sketch Notes, where Lindsay distinguishes
the Sublime from beauty. 16 This is taken by Sellin in the context of
Schopenhauer’s philosophy but treated as departing from it. Whatever may
be said of this, he continues in his supposition that Schopenhauer stands as
Lindsay’s mentor, primarily emphasising Lindsay’s pessimism.
It is the case that in his brooding on the futility of life, Drapier is
implicitly Schopenhauerian. But attention can as easily be focused on the
character of Saltfleet, who, by contrast, exemplifies a more Nietzschean
aesthetic, in which his affirmation of life is coupled to a distance on it, and
on himself. This would make room for a Sublime drawn on the “rarer
pathos” Nietzsche talks of in aphorism (257) of Beyond Good and Evil as

16

Sellin, 176.
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“an ever new widening of distance in the soul itself.” For Nietzsche, it
remains that this distancing is tied to the way the world is, with his
emphasis on hierarchies and rank. Philosophical positions are divided in
this way among Lindsay’s characters and narrative lines. In which case, the
nature of Lindsay’s attitude to the Sublime, and to its communication, must
be looked for in the stories taken as a whole, through the choices he makes
in seeking to express it. Again, I argue that he draws primarily on Hegel.
Another example here is the claim Sellin makes for Schopenhauer’s
influence being reflected in the character of Magnus Colborne in Devil’s
Tor.18 Lindsay describes Colborne as physically resembling Schopenhauer.
But Colborne’s contribution to the discussion around art, in chapter XI of
the book, is actually marked by Helga as an uncharacteristic departure
from his usual attitude, showing “an altogether new aspect” (Devil’s Tor,
176). The characters in the story all, in various ways, fulfil a set of fated
occurrences. And it seems Colborne, too, is affected by the proximity of
the stone in speaking so uncharacteristically. He turns to encouraging Peter
to paint images of the Madonna and goes on to declare the source of the
universe in a feminine principle, which he expands upon as having been
symbolised through the ages in a variety of goddess cults, as worship of the
Great Mother, with the Virgin Mary its most recent iteration. With the
significance Hegel attaches to this imagery, which I turn to next,
Colborne’s change of view is marking that Lindsay draws on Hegel over
Schopenhauer.
But first, it is the stone itself which points to Hegel’s philosophy
providing the broader framework of Lindsay’s approach. In
Phenomenology of Spirit, in paragraph (696), Hegel writes of an inner
being which is “in the first instance, still simple darkness, the unmoved,
the black, formless stone,” and he refers to the stone in the Kaaba at
Mecca. Hegel is talking of Spirit, or the Absolute, as an artificer not yet
aware of itself in what it shapes, which, as J.N. Findlay puts it, “lingers
darkly in the background; when he does represent himself it is in the
shapelessness of a black stone.”19 Hegel says in (696) that the shape
produced by the artificer is the covering for this inner being. As such, it is
an “unessential husk” (Phenomenology, 423).
In the Lectures on Fine Art, Hegel writes that if Spirit is realised in art,
then it is so only in the form of a profound feeling, in its essential nature
identified as love. It is a spiritual existence at stake here, and Hegel affirms

17

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, transl. Judith Norman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 151.
18
Sellin, 175.
19
Findlay, in Hegel, 1977, 580.
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its sublimity in distinguishing it from the appearance of beauty grounded in
the sensuous. The essence of love is given as:
forgetting oneself in another self, yet in this surrender and oblivion
having and possessing oneself alone.20

This is Spirit encountering itself in human form, and, as Stern explains,
it succeeds the kinds of natural religion like that of the Egyptians, because
it is a revelation of the divine’s self-realisation in man.21 Away from the
complexities of Hegel’s account of revealed religion, the progression here
is also a transition in art itself, from what has been said already about the
nature of the Egyptian sculpted sphinx, to the paintings of Madonnas
which Colborne is encouraging Peter Copping to paint. Lindsay is drawing
on Hegel’s account of this transition in art. In the Lectures on Fine Art,
Hegel says that even if an Egyptian sculpture of Isis holding Horus on her
knees might be said to have the same subject as Christian paintings of
Madonna and child, the essential character of Spirit, as love, is absent from
it:
What has Raphael or indeed any other of the great Italian masters
not made of the Madonna and the Christ-child! What depth of
feeling, what spiritual life, what inner wealth of profound emotion,
what sublimity and charm, what a human heart, though one wholly
penetrated by the divine Spirit, does not speak to us out of every
line of these pictures! … But above all it is not the visible beauty of
the figures but the spiritual animation (Fine Art, 3.III, ch.1 (1)).

I suggest that Lindsay’s narratives concern just this kind of progression in
the self-realisation of Spirit, as a revelation of the Sublime, or of the
essence of love.
It is the pre-conceptual response to such images, in their symbolic
character, which underpins their use, not least in the visionary scenes
which occur in Lindsay’s stories. Again, the theme is visualising the
invisible, not in delivering a meaning, but as communicating the Sublime.
It is in this respect that Helga questions Peter Copping on how an artist can
succeed in seeking to express “the invisible by the visible,” present the
“true soul”, the deepest part of personality (Devil’s Tor, 165). Again, the
discussion begins with a recognisably Schopenhauerian position. Peter
Copping declares the serenity of a painted scene is illusory, and that
beneath a painting’s quietness there should be visible “the mighty
workings of the spirit.” Painting is inferior, he says, to the way in which a
cathedral vault or Beethoven symphony produce a terrific emotion in us,
and he appeals to the same example of Dutch masters which Schopenhauer
20

Hegel, Fine Art, I.2.III.ch. 1 (2a).
Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (London: Routledge,
2002), 190-191.
21
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himself employs. Their serenity is conducive to an illusion, and covers a
violent agitation which is, as it were, the reality. In this respect, Copping is
acknowledging Schopenhauer’s regard for the greater profundity of music,
as expressing the “inner being, the in-itself of the world,” which, he says,
we conceptually mark as will. 22
Copping also dismisses allegorical painting as “wall decoration with a
label attached” (Devil’s Tor, 167), which is a point Schopenhauer makes in
precisely those terms, that such art achieves no more than an inscription.
“Allegory in plastic and pictorial art is a mistaken effort, serving a purpose
entirely foreign to art,” and this is worse, he says, when the meaning is
founded on conventional associations of ideas, such as the image of a rose
indicating secrecy.23 This is what Schopenhauer marks as merely
symbolical, or emblematic, as a degenerate kind of allegory. But the issue
here is complicated by terminology. I shall distinguish symbol from
allegory as a kind of picture-thinking, in contrast to its conceptual “decoding.” The difference is between, say, an eagle’s gaze as symbol of its
regal bearing, just because it expresses that nobility, and something like the
analyses of dream imagery in which the images are treated as standing for
other things, as in Schopenhauer’s example of the rose standing for
secrecy. I adhere to this in my approach to Lindsay’s texts.
The distinction is important in approaching Lindsay’s own use of
imagery. Allegory says something in some other terms which are more
familiar, or perhaps more amenable, or which may, after all, be cryptic and
baffling, but where the challenge is to look beyond their literal meaning.
The particular discussion in Devil’s Tor has not been adequately addressed
in the critical literature. J.B. Pick referred to it only briefly before moving
on, while Kathryn Hume’s analysis of A Voyage to Arcturus treated the
story as fundamentally allegorical.24 But the distinction is integral to the
role Lindsay accords the visionary scenes in his books, in the replayed
“dreams” recorded by Cabot’s machine in Sphinx, or the goddess imagery
in Devil’s Tor. Peter Copping’s Schopenhauerian remarks are not the final
word on what is at stake here. Symbolic imagery, in the sense I have
indicated, is tied to what Hegel marks as “picture-thinking” and its role in
the self-realisation of Spirit. In section (776) of Phenomenology of Spirit,
22

Schopenhauer, 264.
Ibid., 237-239.
24
Pick, as in n. 1 above, 172; Kathryn Hume, “Visionary Allegory in David
Lindsay’s A Voyage to Arcturus,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology, 77
(1978): 72 -91.
23

.
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Hegel addresses how mankind’s self-consciousness arises as the
recognition of his separation from animal nature, which is seen as “other,”
and as an evil. In its picture form, it is the Bible story of the “fall” of man,
eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. It has a positive
aspect because it sets in motion a return to the pre-fallen state. As such, it
is the ascent of Spirit, in coming to self-knowledge through the creation.
But crucially, at the level of picture-thinking, Spirit is identical with the
diverse forms and shapes in Creation. Under this aspect, in Lindsay’s
Voyage, it is the god sought by Maskull, under the name Shaping.
It was seen above how Lindsay draws on Hegel’s appeal to the image
of the sphinx, as symbolising the self-realisation of human spirit out of
what is “other” to it. In this role, such an image is identical with what it
purports to sign. This characterisation of symbolic imagery is traceable to
the work of Georg Friedrich Creuzer, with which Hegel was familiar,
having known him personally as well. In Creuzer’s Symbolik und
Mythologie der Alten Vӧlker (1819), the distinction between symbol and
allegory was key to his argument that a religious symbolism originated
with a priestly caste in ancient India and was subsequently received into
other cultures.25 It is integral to this transmission that the symbol carries its
own significance, independently of language. Creuzer points to images of a
slaughtered bull, for example, which are widely distributed across different
cultures, highlighting their use on coins and other artefacts. In its symbolic
character, it is of a piece with an image like that of an eagle’s stare, which
effectively is what it signs, because the image already gives the sense of
the bird’s regal bearing. Creuzer treats this symbolic character as
complemented by a symbol’s openness to further interpretation, where this
tension then provides it is suited to religious ceremony and a priest’s
activity in turning people away from everyday concerns.
There are accounts of Creuzer’s theory of symbolism in Gadamer and
Todorov, and the wider context and implications of his theory of cultural
transmission have been set out by Williamson.26 In section (30) of the first
volume of Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Vӧlker, an image of sunlight
fractured into a rainbow spectrum by obscuring clouds is Creuzer’s own
metaphor for the complexity in a symbol’s meaning, in which symbolic
character and a plurality of interpretations are joined.27 A symbol has force
25

Friedrich Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Völker (Leipzig und
Darmstadt: Beiheyer und Leske, 1819).
26
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. (London: Sheed & Ward, 1993);
Tzvetan Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, transl. Catherine Porter (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1982); George S. Williamson, The Longing for Myth in
Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press (2004).
27
Creuzer, 58-59.
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in pointing “beyond” conventional associations. And in the context of
religious practices, this fractured meaning allows a sense in which the
symbol reconciles two realms, human and divine, to recover an “original
connection” between gods and men. Williamson explains, as well, how
work by the brothers Grimm, and by Franz Josef Mone, who was a student
of Creuzer, was instrumental in establishing a Germanic mythology drawn
from the Nordic Eddas and from German folklore; Jacob Grimm, in
Deutsche Mythologie, added the supposition of an Earth Mother cult,
drawing on Tacitus’ description in Germania of the worship of a goddess,
Hertha.28
Lindsay’s interest in these aspects of German culture is evident in
Devil’s Tor, when Magnus Colborne expounds on motherhood and a
female Nature, and on what he takes to be the fact of worship of the Great
Mother “under many names, in many lands” (Devil’s Tor, 174-179). And
the influence of Creuzer’s work on Hegel has been argued by Magee, who
points to it as underpinning the sense of a “pre-reflective wisdom” and its
partial but developing expression in the progress of art, religion and
philosophy.29 This is the activity of the Absolute, seeking its self-conscious
realisation in mankind, as an “unconsciously busy” activity of thought in
all our purposes and interests (ibid., 84-85).
Specifically, Creuzer regarded the symbolism of the Virgin Mary as
continuing that of Demeter and Cybele. The same can be said of the
ancient goddess in Devil’s Tor, and which is tied to Ingrid Fleming’s fated
role. As an image, it is, in Lindsay’s story, simply that of a goddess or
regal woman, very tall, and clothed in “antique draperies, of no
recognisable fashion” (Devil’s Tor, 39). It is also personified in Ingrid
Fleming herself. These are, as it were, its covering shapes. This is indicated
in Helga’s reflections on how her daughter has been affected by what has
happened:
She was ceasing to be her girl, and changing to some more ancient
ancestral self, such as she, her mother, might never understand; but
its externals – this new alien nature’s – could scarcely be more than
hard shell for a seed infinitely rich and tender, unable as yet to face
the world’s mocks, sneers and violations … she meant, such hints
beneath Ingrid’s apathy as these faint stirrings, like the half seen,
half imagined troubling from below the surface of a drowsing lake:
of haughtiness, sibylline vision, foreignness, power … they were
not new, however, but very old, very intrinsic in her opening,
wondering soul (Devil’s Tor, 404-405).

28
29

Williamson, 107.
Magee, as in n.7 above, 85.

134
Eric Wills
Helga goes on to remark this could be the vestige of a prehistoric type,
from before the founding of the great religions. As such, it is a preconceptual expression of Spirit.
Hermeticism
This is the point at which to question claims of a gnostic vision in
Lindsay’s work. In addressing what he argues is the hermetic character of
Hegel’s thinking, Magee points to a crucial difference between hermetic
and gnostic perspectives. The difference is a clear one. In hermeticism,
God’s own knowledge of himself depends upon His creative activity,
through the realisation of that knowledge in mankind. By contrast, the
gnostic entirely separates God and creation, and refuses to allow God is in
any way dependent on mankind.30 This is important to assessing what has
been claimed for the gnostic character of David Lindsay’s stories. In
adherence to Hegel’s philosophy, Lindsay’s position is similarly hermetic.
Hegel talks in terms of Spirit’s own return to itself, through its activity in
the world. This requires turning away from the everyday interests which
comprise our egoistic selves. But, crucially, this is not a simple intuition of
something “beyond” or higher than us, or of our dissolution in some
original unity. Rather, it depends upon a particular sense of negating,
through which what is real must know itself as subject:
the life of God and divine cognition may well be spoken of as a
disporting of Love with itself; but this idea sinks into mere
edification, and even insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the
suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative.31

The negative is a process of formation of a Subject through its
alienation from what is “other” to it, together with reflection in this
otherness. This dynamic sense of the “labour of the negative” opposes any
supposition that existence is unriddled in some mystic intuition, or that we
might start from some immediate knowledge of the Absolute, starting, in
Hegel’s metaphor, like a “shot from a pistol” (ibid., 16). It is telling in
Sphinx, that Maurice Ferreira makes his demands on Lore Jensen at
gunpoint, and is found, in the end, to be really soulless.
Finally, it is implicit as well, that in this labour of the negative, the selfrealisation of Spirit is delivered in following Hegel’s own exposition of the
course it takes. This is the sense in which Hegel’s philosophy is initiatory,
enabling the reader’s own transcendence in a higher self, as a kind of
purification in anticipation of Wisdom.32 At the level of Lindsay’s artistry,
the same may be claimed for his stories, in ambition at least. His
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characters’ self-realisations are frustrated or partial, and, as with Lore
Jensen’s musical composition, there remains the artistic limitations of the
stories themselves. But it need not be supposed that Lindsay is seeking to
answer a riddle, as such. Rather, the stories are his own sculpted sphinx, a
hybrid of the mundane egoism of the characters’ everyday concerns and
interests, and their reflection in a supernatural “other.” The visionary
character of the disturbances they suffer emphasises a symbolic imagery
over mere allegory. As such, Lindsay indicates the pre-rational, partial selfrealisation of Geist in art and in its labour of the negative. But it is
mankind as symbol of the divine which constitutes Hegel’s hermeticism,
and Lindsay’s, too.
Conclusion
The visionary scenes in Sphinx and Devil’s Tor are coupled to narratives
which play out in the stories through the characters’ interrelations with
each other in the everyday world of egoistic concerns and conventional
attitudes. The affective power of these scenes generally is drawn by
Lindsay on their visually symbolic character, distinct from the conceptual
associations which would sustain an allegorical interpretation. The latter
kind of interpretation would itself only reflect our “common” language and
cultural conventions. For Peter Copping in Devil’s Tor, the question how
to express “the invisible by the visible” is raised in terms of whether an
artist must dismiss these conventional “outsides” as false, and be
determined only to paint “insides.” He answers that outsides are not false,
as such, but frequently “disagree with what they cover” (Devil’s Tor, 166167). The same may be said of much of what goes on in Lindsay’s later
stories, in which characters puzzle over their relations with each other,
while unsettled by supernatural disturbances. In Sphinx, for example, the
insides are made visible by Cabot’s dream-recording machine and
experienced on playback. I have argued Lindsay takes this inside-outside
relation in the way that Hegel talks of inner being and its “unessential
husk.”33 The “inner” is visible in the way that Peter Copping remarks that
“a symbol is a mystic sign of the Creator” (Devil’s Tor, 167).
How far Lindsay succeeds in his ambition to communicate the sublime
is a matter of his own capabilities as writer. There is an initiatory aspect if
the text is intended as conjuring an awareness in the reader, however
opaque, of something, as it were, behind the story. This is perhaps more
successful in Sphinx, where we might suppose the dark, unconscious
dreamworld is struggling for self-realisation in Lindsay’s own artistry, as
much as it would be in Lore Jensen’s musical composition. Lindsay’s text
33
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would be like Cabot’s recording machine in this respect. If it succeeds in
unsettling the reader, then it is initiatory in the way that is claimed for
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, where his exposition of the vicissitudes
of Spirit is itself a means to its self-realisation, in the reader’s
consciousness.34 In Lindsay’s literary form, its partial realisation is the
limitations of a visual symbolism. It is, in any case, the obstacles to
realising the sublime which make up the bulk of Lindsay’s narratives. At
issue is whether the visual character of his visionary scenes is, as it were, a
way of shortcutting these tribulations. It is more likely they are
complementary. Lindsay defended, for example, the characters’ laborious
deliberations in Devil’s Tor as integral to his concerns in the story. Further
call may be made on details of Hegel’s philosophy here, but I have sought
to emphasise that aspect of Lindsay’s texts which relies on a particular use
of symbolism and its implications for the hermeticism that I have argued is
the basis of his world-vision.
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